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ABSTRACT
Peer effects have figured prominently in debates on school vouchers, desegregation, ability tracking
and anti-poverty programs. Compelling evidence of their existence remains scarce for plaguing
endogeneity issues such as selection bias and the reflection problem. This paper firmly establishes
a link between peer performance and student achievement, using a unique dataset from China. We
find strong evidence that peer effects exist and operate in a positive and nonlinear manner; reducing
the variation of peer performance increases achievement; and our semi-parametric estimates clarify
the tradeoffs facing policymakers in exploiting positive peers effects to increase future achievement.
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A revival of interest has developed in recent years among social scientists to ascertain
whether non-market (or social) interactions aﬀect a variety of individual outcomes. These
interactions demonstrate that interdependence among individuals may go well beyond
their responses to private economic incentives such as price and income. The impact of
these interactions upon outcomes of interest have been given among other names “social
capital,” “contagion,” “neighborhood eﬀects” and for the focus of the present paper “peer
group eﬀects.” For example, each student inﬂuences her classmates not only through
knowledge spillovers and how teachers respond to her, but also in how she aﬀects classroom
standards. A less disciplined student is more likely to disrupt her classmates, forcing the
teacher to devote more time in class to disciplining rather than transmitting knowledge.
Therefore a student’s performance in school may be inﬂuenced by the characteristics and
behavior of her peers. If these peer group eﬀects are substantial, government policy may
exploit them by optimally grouping students in diﬀerent classrooms to achieve desired
socioeconomic outcomes.
The rekindled interest in non-market interactions is motivated in part by recent theo-
retical developments in the economics literature which demonstrate that the composition
of peer groups aﬀect the optimal organization of schools, neighborhoods and other are-
nas where agents interact. Recent theoretical analyses of school choice showing that the
introduction of vouchers could increase competition and improve the eﬃciency of public
2schools rely on the existence of positive peer eﬀects (e.g. Epple and Romano (1998), Cau-
cutt (2001), and Nechyba (2000)). Further, a number of recent macroeconomic growth
models (e. g. Benabou (1996) and Kremer (1993)) depend on certain form of peer eﬀects
for their optimal organization of neighborhoods and jobs of diﬀerent skill levels respec-
tively. Peer group eﬀects have also played a prominent role in policy debates concerning
ability tracking, school desegregation, aﬃrmative action and anti-poverty programs in
both rural areas and urban ghettos.
While substantial theoretical developments have been made recently on the eﬀects of
peers (and other social interactions), there does not exist much compelling empirical evi-
dence on whether and how peer group characteristics aﬀect a variety of student outcomes.1
Empirical analyses on the eﬀects of peer groups have been plagued by various conceptual
and data problems.2 Many commonly used datasets suﬀer from signiﬁcant attrition bias
as they fail to track those students who switched in between and out of schools, which
results in choice based samples.3 Moreover, such datasets often lack information on impor-
1T h el i t e r a t u r eo np e e rg r o u pe ﬀects in education dates back to the publication of the
Coleman Report (Coleman et al. 1966). Numerous studies have since been conducted in
both the economics, sociology and education literatures which ﬁnd either weak or non-
existent peer eﬀects. Recently, Hoxby (2000) and Sacerdote (2001) found positive peer
eﬀects employing sources of exogenous variation in peer group composition which are
outlined later in this section. We provide only a partial review of the recent literature
concerning peer eﬀects. Nechyba (2005) presents a more comprehensive survey of the
theoretical and computational literature and Hoxby and Weingarth (2006) provide a clear
overview and examine the performance of diﬀerent empirical models used in the literature.
2See Manski (1993), Manski (2000) and Moﬃtt (2001) for comprehensive discussion.
3This is especially problematic for studies using metropolitan US datasets, where ap-
proximately 20% of the students are believed to switch in between and out of schools
3tant factors such as teacher quality and student innate ability. The analyses are further
complicated by various endogeneity issues such as the reﬂection problem and selection
bias. A reﬂection problem arises when student and peer achievement are determined si-
multaneously, which inherently convolutes the measure of peers’ inﬂuence. Selection bias
leads to a correlated unobservables problem when families select into neighborhoods and
schools for their children based in part on some unobserved group characteristics they
favor. Thus an observed positive association between one’s own outcome and that of the
p e e r sm a yn o tb ec a u s a lb u td u et os o m eu n k n o w nf a c t o r st h a ta ﬀect both peer quality
a n do n e ’ so w ne d u c a t i o n a lp e r f o r m a n c e .T h is issue plagues studies using data from the
United States and many other countries where parents have much freedom in selecting
schools.
Researchers have attempted to overcome the selection bias in one of three ways. The
most popular method is the use of instrumental variables (see Evans, Oates and Schwab
(1992) and Gaviria and Raphael (2001) among others) to mitigate the correlation between
unobservables and peer variables. But the statistical properties and economic validity
of these instruments are of debate.4 Recently, several studies have exploited credible
annually. For example, Hanushek, Kain and Rivkin (2004) report that in Texas approxi-
mately 50% of children switch schools at least once between grades four and seven even
after excluding changes due to the transition from elementary to middle school.
4Heckman (1997) considers the economic interpretation of instrumental variable esti-
mators in general. The statistical concerns extend beyond the weak instrument problem.
For example, Rivkin (2001) argues that the use of metropolitan wide aggregate data as
instruments in the Evans, Oates and Schwab (1992) study exacerbates the speciﬁcation
error in peer eﬀect estimates.
4exogenous variations to identify the eﬀects of peers on student outcomes. Sacerdote (2001)
has provided some of the strongest evidence that peer eﬀects exist at the college level by
e x p l o i t i n gt h ef a c tt h a tr o o m m a t e sa r ec o n ditionally randomly assigned at Dartmouth
college.5 Hoxby (2000) introduces two empirical strategies based on the assumption that
students are randomly assigned across classrooms based on gender and race to recover
estimates of peer eﬀects free of selection bias. Alternatively, researchers have acquired or
collected rich datasets (see Hanushek, Kain, Markman and Rivkin (2003)) that provide
strong controls to capture the selection process. We follow the last strategy and use a
unique dataset from a county in China’s Jiangsu Province.
The primary goal of this study is to examine whether peer groups aﬀect students’
academic achievement in China’s secondary schools.6 The secondary school system in
China diﬀers markedly from that of the United States. Its features and institutional
structure yield signiﬁcant beneﬁts for research aimed at identifying the impact of peer
group characteristics on academic achievement. In particular, i) we are able to separate
the eﬀect of teacher quality from peer eﬀects, ii) attrition bias is not a concern in our
dataset, and iii) students are assigned into schools based primarily on observable test
scores. Therefore, the majority of cross sectional variation in a students’ peer group is
5This methodology has also been used in Zimmerman (2003) and Kremer and Levy
(2003) who use data from diﬀerent selective higher education institutions where roomates
and dormmates are conditionally randomly assigned.
6To the best of our knowledge this is the ﬁrst such study using micro data from China
and the developing world. See Hanushek (1995) or Kremer (1995) for recent surveys of
school eﬃcacy in developing countries.
5NOT generated by selection on unobservables in our setting. A second aim of the study is
to investigate in detail how peer groups aﬀect student achievement and discuss the policy
implications.
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we describe China’s secondary
education system and the dataset that we have collected. In section 3 we introduce
the model that guides our estimation. We demonstrate that the institutional structure
of China’s secondary school system in combination with our econometric methodology
overcomes most of the problems associated with peer eﬀects estimation. Our empirical
results are presented and discussed in section 4. There is strong evidence that peer
eﬀects exist in China’s secondary schools. We ﬁnd that students beneﬁtf r o mh a v i n g
higher achieving schoolmates and from having less variation in the quality of peers in
their schools. Peer eﬀects operate in a heterogeneous manner: students who score in the
top quantiles on the college entrance examination beneﬁt nearly twice as much from their
peers as students who score in the lowest quantiles from similar peers. Our semiparametric
estimates unveil the diﬃculties facing policy makers when they choose educational policies
that assigns students of diﬀerent achievement levels across schools (streaming or mixing)
to yield higher future achievement. Finally, we demonstrate that linear peer eﬀects are
not identiﬁed in a value added model using a ﬁxed eﬀects estimator with a one way error
c o m p o n e n tw h e r et h ep e e rv a r i a b l ei sd e ﬁned at the same level as the error component.7
7If measures of peers are taken at the school (classroom) level, the coeﬃcient on mean
peer eﬀects would not be identiﬁed if school (classroom) indicators are included in a ﬁxed
6We introduce an alternative strategy that permits identiﬁcation of linear peer eﬀects with
unobserved ﬁxed error component. A concluding section summarizes our ﬁndings and
discusses directions for future research.
2 China’s Secondary Education System
Our research focuses on secondary schools in one county in China’s Jiangsu Province.8 The
generous cooperation of local oﬃcials allowed us to collect a unique dataset that follows
nearly 1,300 students’ academic histories from the completion of junior high school in 1995
through the admission to colleges in 1998. The county has a population of approximately
one million in the sample period. It is an aﬄuent county typical of the booming coastal
regions of China: the per capita incomes for both urban and rural households were over
three times the national averages for each sector in 1997.9 This data set is composed
of individual scores on high school and college entrance exams in all six subject areas,
matched teacher data from administrative records for over 1,000 teachers, annual local
government investment (spending) in each school as well as other sources of school input.
In China, entrance examination scores are by far the most important determinant of
admission to both senior middle schools (10th grade to 12th grade)and colleges.10 Within
eﬀects regression with two periods of data per student using a levels or linear growth
speciﬁcation of the education production function.
8Per our agreement with the local government we do not identify the county by name.
9Source: County Statistical Yearbook on Education, 1995-2000.
10Current education reforms in China aim at the ultimate elimination of high school
7each county, there is a clear ranking of high schools and there is keen competition to
attend higher ranked schools. It is common knowledge among the population whether a
school is a national model school, a provincial keynote school or a school that focuses on
teaching students trade skills. Students compete for positions in the higher ranked schools
by writing a municipal level high school entrance examination at the completion of junior
middle school (7th grade to 9th grade).11 This three-day examination covers material in
six subject areas.12 Since 1995, the entrance examination have underwent continuous re-
design to reduce the eﬀectiveness of drilling and teaching towards the test.13 The subject
areas are Chinese, English, mathematics, physics, chemistry, and politics. Scores on this
exam determine high school admission. Exceptions fall under the category of showing
exceptional ability in a subject area, ﬁne arts, music or athletics.
In their ﬁn a ly e a ro fs e n i o rm i d d l es c h o o l( 12th grade), college bound students list their
preferences for various majors at colleges and universities, which is typically followed
entrance examination as educators argue that it overburdens students.
11A municipality in China diﬀers markedly from one in North America. There are several
counties and one city within a municipality, which bears similarity to a Metropolitan
Statistical Area (MSA) in the US.
12These six subject areas account for a total of 640 points. The remaining 45 points are
scores based on physical ﬁtness. Rosen (1982) explains that the introduction of admission
examinations resulted in students spending an inordinate amount of time learning facts
they became less politically and physically active. Beginning in 1981, the criteria used
for admission changed to include athletic ability since many argued that a student needs
a well-balanced education intellectually, morally and physically.
13Discussions with teachers and local education bureau oﬃcials gave us a strong impres-
sion that educators are increasingly aware of these changes and are feeling the pressure
from such changes.
8by a three-day nationwide college entrance examination that encompasses material in
six subject areas.14 There are two versions of the college entrance exams. One is for
students wishing to major in the arts and is composed of questions in Chinese, English,
mathematics, geology, history, and politics. The other, for science majors, covers material
in Chinese, English, mathematics, physics, chemistry and biology. Both exams were scaled
out of 750 in 1998. The scores on these exams together with the preference lists, determine
which major of a university or college the student can attend.
In China, the competition for positions in colleges or universities is very keen. In 1999,
only 10.7% of the population between 18-25 were either in the process of completing or
had obtained a tertiary degree.15 Since there are many more applicants than there are
positions available in colleges and universities this may result in some strategic choices
made by the students when ﬁlling out their preference lists.
We have collected the cumulative scores on the municipal high school entrance exam-
ination for all junior middle students graduating in 1995. For eleven of the sixteen senior
middle schools in the county we know of the junior middle school each incoming student
was from and have indicators if the student was admitted based on exceptional skills in
art, music or athletics (in these situations admission test scores play a smaller role). The
14There are some areas in China where students do not compete in this manner. Be-
ginning in July 2002, college entrance examination will be restricted to four subject areas
instead of six in many parts of China to reduce the burden imposed on students.
15Further, this ﬁgure comes after the government introduced a massive program boosting
the number of admissions in colleges by mandating colleges to accept more students.
Source: Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian (China Statistical Yearbook) 2000.
9records also indicate that some students were admitted prior to the entrance exam based
on their strong academic records in junior high schools.16 These records further provide
us with several demographic variables about each student and their family. Finally, we
have collected the scores on the 1998 National College Entrance Examination for the same
cohort of students. The scores obtained on these exams are almost the sole determinant
of admission to college. For each of these students, we are aware of the particular major
of a college or university which granted admission. This information is matched with the
incoming test scores so that we are able to follow nearly 1300 students from completion
of junior high school through admission to a tertiary education institute.
We have collected information on school inputs from the administrative records of
ten of the county’s sixteen secondary schools from 1995 to 1998. These records provide
us not only with individual level information on each teacher’s demographic variables,
education and teaching history, but most importantly contain information on a measure
of teacher quality. In China, the local education bureau assesses each teacher using both
objective and subjective performance measures of factors including classroom instruction,
work ethics and student performance. Based on these assessments, teachers are ranked
within the education system and can be promoted from intern (newly hired) to third-
class, second-class, ﬁrst-class and ﬁnally superior-class teacher. These rankings together
16These students still complete the high school entrance examination and are encouraged
to perform to the best of their abilities. This occurs frequently as the inclusion of these
students will raise the average test score for the corresponding junior middle schools. It
is clear that these students do not face the same incentives as other test takers.
10with years of teaching experience uniquely determine components of teachers’ salaries.17
This information is matched with the student data so that we obtain accurate measures
of school inputs.18
Table 1 presents summary statistics on the characteristics of students and school inputs
available to students at schools of diﬀerent rankings in 1998. Notice that schools that are
nationally or provincially ranked have a higher percentage of instructors who are in the
superior class. Interestingly, average teaching experience is lower in these ranked schools
than in the unranked schools. This occurs since ranked schools can attract younger
teachers with higher degrees. Teachers in these ranked schools are also more likely to
teach the subjects in which they hold their degrees. It appears that teachers in the
national model school teach fewer sections and courses. Test scores for the incoming
classes are higher and variation in these scores lower in national and provincially ranked
schools versus the unranked schools. In particular, there is little variation in performance
at the national model school. Students at the national model school are most likely to
obtain tertiary education and at the Bachelor’s level. In most schools the majority of
17See Ding and Lehrer (2002) for a detailed explanation and analysis of China’s teacher
compensation system.
18C l a s ss i z e sa v e r a g e5 2-5 6s t u d e n t si nt h ed a t a .T h e r ei sv e r yl i t t l ev a r i a t i o ni nc l a s s
size within and across schools. We are able to match students in four of the nine schools
to their teachers and school investment data. The local education bureau claimed that
since teacher rankings were based in part on student performance, students were quite
randomly assigned across classrooms for fairness purposes. On our return trip to China
this spring we collected classroom data. We veriﬁed the claimed randomization using
simple regressions and tests for diﬀerences between classes.
11students are accepted into college certiﬁcate programs. Due to incomplete data on college
enrollment in school 7 it appears that school 2 and school 4, which are not ranked, place a
greater percentage of students in tertiary institutions than this provincially ranked school.
The local government invests substantially more funds in national and provincial model
schools than in unranked schools. This is not surprising since local Chinese governments
usually associate economic growth with the education level of its population. Annual
reports even advertise the number of superior teachers in the local school system to
attract outside investment. Furthermore, nationally and provincially ranked schools tend
to receive more external donations than unranked schools, which exacerbates the inequities
across the schools.19 On our visit, we observed that ranked schools tend to have more
modern facilities. Overall, this data assists greatly in estimating education production
functions since we have i) valid outcome measures that accurately proxy achievement due
to the comprehensiveness of the mandatory exams in diﬀerent subject matters and strong
incentives for students to perform to their best on the exam, ii) no attrition bias as not
a single student left the sample, iii) reduced omitted variable bias problems as we have
actual measures of teacher quality and iv) complete information on the format of the
school assignment algorithm.
19Accurate information on the exact size of these external donations was not recorded
by either the school board or individual schools.
123E m p i r i c a l M o d e l
In this section, we provide a simple model that guides our estimation and describe how
our dataset aids in overcoming many problems associated with peer eﬀects estimation
that have plagued empirical researches. We view the education process at period T in
two stages. In stage 1, a student is matched to a school. Denote SiT to be the school
matched to child i at time T. To distinguish our empirical strategy from those commonly
used in the literature we consider two matching processes. A school selection process
takes place if the education system does not permit schools to exclude students based
on their qualities (achievement, abilities, etc.). In this case, altruistic parents select the
optimal school j∗ for child i (SiT = j∗) which provides the highest indirect utility for their
household V ∗
ij,
Vij ≡ Vij(Xi,C j,P j,Q j,A iT−1,I i), for each j available to child i (1)
where Xi are observable person-speciﬁc and family characteristics of the child i; Cj is the
cost of attending school j, which include the cost if living in a good school district; Pj
captures the characteristics of peers in school j, assuming parents have perfect foresight
at stage one (or peer characteristics do not vary much over time); Qj is school-speciﬁc
characteristics; AiT−1indexes child i’s measured achievement at the stage of decision mak-
ing; and Ii is child i’s innate abilities. The availability of schools to a child is described by
the school admission rules in the local areas where parents can commute to work daily.
13When schools admit students based on their qualities, a school assignment process
takes place. School j has the jthhighest minimum quality requirement, τjT, for admission
if we sort schools based on some quality function QiT ≡ q(Ii,A iT−1) that maps each child’s
abilities and past achievement into a quality score. Each child i is assigned as follows:
SiT = j if τjT ≤ QiT <τ j−1T,( 2 )
In the second stage, conditional on the selection or assignment of school j at the
ﬁrst stage, the complete history of inputs [(XiT...Xi0),(P−ijT...P−ij0),(QjT...Qjo)], and
independent random shocks ( iT... i0), the child gains knowledge as measured by a score
on an achievement test:
AijT= f(XiT...Xi0,P −ijT...P−ij0,Q jT...Qjo,I i, iT... i0) (3)








where δit = α5tεit for some coeﬃcient α5t. The components of equation 4 may include
higher order and interaction terms.
Following, Boardman and Murnane (1979) we re-express the achievement function as
AijT = β0 + β1XiT + β2P−ijT + β3QjT + β4Ii + β5AijT−1 +  iT (5)
14where the vector X contains individual characteristics (gender interacted with the resi-
dential status of each student’s family where males from urban areas are treated as the
comparison group), the vector I contains indicator variables for individual skills that cap-
ture portions of innate abilities and P−ijT is a vector of variables that captures the prior
achievement of all other students in the same cohort within that school. The inclusion
of Aijt−1 in the regression is to pick up a variety of confounding inﬂuences including the
prior, and often unrecorded as well as unobserved history of parental, school and com-
munity eﬀects. The implied restrictive assumption for this type of model is that Aijt−1
is a suﬃcient statistic of all the previous inﬂuences. This assumes that Aijt−1 is a state
variable that follows a Markov process.20 Note, in our baseline speciﬁcation we include the
mean, the mean squared and the variance of the peers’ high school entrance examinations
scores.
3.1 Estimation
The general empirical challenge facing researchers in estimating problem equation 5 is
endogeneity of the peer variable which can arise and be formulated in more than one
manner. In the economics of education literature, the most discussed form of endogeneity
20This assumption requires that the eﬀect of observed and unobserved factors in the
production process to be adjusting over time at the same rate as no past inputs and
shocks are left unrepresented by Aijt−1. Due to the limitation of almost all education data
sets, this assumption is adopted for practical reasons and has not been tested to the best
of our knowledge.
15is the endogenous group membership problem. When public school admission decisions are
mostly based on residential location, the conditional expectation of the error term when
school j is chosen , E( ijT|SiT = ji fV ijT >= VikT for all k 6= j), does not typically
equal zero.21 Since VijT can include many such factors to decision making that are similar
within a community and not typically contained in a dataset, concerns regarding biased
coeﬃcient estimates become serious.
In contrast to the typical US experience of a school selection process, a school assign-
ment process based primarily on characteristics observable in our data matches students
to senior middle schools in China. Students can attend a given school from anywhere
within the county and dormitories are provided at very low cost to accommodate stu-
dents from neighboring communities or rural areas. For this reason there is no need for
people to form communities within this county based on characteristics that henceforth
inﬂuence school composition.22 This result is originally pointed out by Barnow, Gold-
berger and Cain (1981) : “Unbiasedness is attainable when the variables that determined
21In this case when a school selection process matches children to school, parents who
care about child’s education are willing to pay higher housing prices to move to a good
school district (see Black (1999)) and are more likely to engage in actions to improve their
child’s performance.
22Social network (Guanxi) in China plays a limited role in determining who gets access
to the better senior middle schools. School assignment based on public information (test
scores) reﬂects in part the strong common preference for fair assignment process, which
is monitored by each family whose child is concerned. In counties such as the one studied
in this paper where extreme importance is attached to education, the scope with which
network can aﬀect the assignment process is minimized. Moreover, any back-door admis-
sions are generally rationalized as if the student had exceptional ability in a particular
subject area, ﬁne arts, music or athletics, for which we have indicators to control.
16the assignment rule are known, quantiﬁed and included in the [estimating] equation.”
Let SC
iT to indicate the school assigned to child i at time T in China. In this setting
if we consider the eﬀects of school assignment on student achievement (equation 5), the
conditional expectation is given as:
E[AijT|S
C




= β0+β1XiT+β2P−ijT+β3QjT+β4Ii+β5AiT−1+E( ijT|τjT≤ q(Ii,A iT−1) <τ j−1T) (7)
Since all the variables to the right of the conditional operator are known, and all the
schools follow the same deterministic assignment rule, E(∗)=0 , a simple regression
would obtain unbiased parameter estimates.
To determine admission each senior middle school is provided with each student ap-
plicant’s high school entrance examination and information on exceptional skills from the
local education bureau. The ﬁles are sent in a sequential manner ensuring that the higher
ranked schools have the privilege of recruiting the best students.23 Administrators at
each senior high school convert this information to a single index and grant admission
to students whose index is above a cutoﬀ score. To verify whether students were truly
23Students are restricted to apply to one school at each quality level, a factor that
we exploit in one of our empirical strategies described below. The philosophy behind
national and provincial model schools is that they are necessary to eﬀectively train top-
level manpower needed for China’s development. In certain parts of China, such as
Shenzhen, Xiamen, Shanghai and Changchun such schools have drawn criticism for being
elitist and have been abolished conceptually.
17assigned to type of schools based on the observables in our data we used an ordered probit
regression of the rank of the school (unranked, aﬃliated with the ranked schools, provin-
cial school and national school) on the incoming test scores and indicator variables for
early admission or talent in subject areas. We then used our estimates to construct the
predicted probability that each student was assigned to each school type. Assuming that
each student attended the school type to which she had the highest predicted probability
we compared these predicted assignments to the actual assignment. In total we ﬁnd that
96.67% of the matches are accurate,24 leaving little room for any unobserved factor to
potentially bias the estimates of equation 5.25
Simultaneity problem in peer eﬀect estimation was ﬁrst coined the ”reﬂection problem”
in Manski (1993), as it is similar to the problem of interpreting the almost simultaneous
24We received unoﬃcial formulas that conﬁrmed that assignment was based solely on
these characteristics and they were treated in a linear fashion with weights. The coeﬃcient
estimates are available from the authors by request. The concordance rates between
predicted and actual assignment by school type were 97.55%, 89.74%, 99.19% and 93.7%
respectively.
25Potential candidates in our setting for such unobservables may exist due to parents’
preference to be geographically close to their child or the selection process by the student
prior to the high school entrance examination. To simplify the high school admission
process, students are required to choose one of the three provincial model schools as their
most preferred school before their High School Entrance Examination. Although all the
provincial schools are of the same rank they may have diﬀerent cutoﬀ scores for admission
due to the number of applications. Thus a student with score 588 may attend a lower
ranked school if his preferred provincial school has the cutoﬀ score at 590, even though his
score exceeded the cutoﬀ of another provincial school (say 585). The choices of students
among the provincial schools reﬂect their locational preferences and strategic guessing
(i.e. which school may have a lower cutoﬀ score), which do not correlate with academic
performances.
18movements of a person and her reﬂection in a mirror. The problem occurs if the peer
variable measures classmates’ achievement at time T, which is obtained at the same time
as one’s own achievement. In our education production function, all the regressors are
known (predetermined) at the time of regression, which in theory avoids simultaneity
problems. Moreover, our peer variable is constructed using academic scores measured
immediately prior to any interactions among classmates, which captures the background
of one’s peers. We argue that a student’s current performance is not a function of the
current outcomes of his or her peers, but rather depends on peer quality used to form
the student body. Manski notes that if the transmission of peer eﬀects really follows this
temporal pattern, the identiﬁcation problem is alleviated.
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Do Peer Eﬀects Exist?
Ordinary least squares estimates of our baseline equation 5 are reported in Table 2. The
ﬁrst column presents the results for the full sample. With the exception of the tuition
variable, each regressor enters in a statistically signiﬁcant manner.26 The results suggest
26The bottom 25% of the incoming students in terms of admission scores are required to
pay higher tuition fees than other incoming students in each school. The local education
bureau claimed that in this county where education is highly valued, almost no one refused
to pay and went to either a lower ranked school or dropped out of school. Although there
is no selection in tuition payment, those students may face diﬀerent incentives as their
parents may expect more in the results. See Ding and Lehrer (2002) for a discussion of
19that a 1% increase in peer quality will increase one’s college entrance examination score
by 0.088%. In other words, the eﬀect of an increase in peer’s incoming test scores is
equivalent to about one twelfth (0.078%)o ft h ee ﬀect of a corresponding increase in
one’s own incoming test score. The sign on the peer squared term suggests a concave
relationship in peer eﬀect. Furthermore, the results suggest that individuals respond
negatively to an increase in the variation of their peers’ performance.
Not surprisingly, winning an academic award or being awarded early admission is
positively related to future student test performance, while skills in music and athletics
are correlated with poorer performance. Urban females score lower than rural females.
This may be explained by the greater accessibility to high school education for urban
females than their rural counterparts as the negative impact of being a female may not
aﬀect a top student as much as it aﬀects an average student.
The school quality variables included are mainly teacher quality variables. The es-
timated coeﬃcients in both regressions indicate that students beneﬁtm o s tf r o mh i g h e r
ranked teachers, which suggests the importance of teacher inputs.27 The natural collinear-
ity between the school quality variables may explain the implausibly large magnitude of
the associated coeﬃcients. It is worth noting that even with the removal of the school
survey evidence which demonstrates that families in urban areas of China rarely refuse
to pay higher tuition fees.
27The excluded group is the sum of percentage of third class and new teachers. Nearly
all new teachers are promoted to third class within their ﬁrst year and as such we assume
that teaching quality would not diﬀer between these ranks.
20quality variables a concave relationship in peers exists. The results suggest that a 1%
increase in the quality of peers will increase one’s score on the college entrance examina-
tion by 0.41%. This estimate provides an upper bound for the eﬀect of peers since school
quality is positively correlated with peer quality. The ﬁnding that second class teachers
beneﬁt students slightly more than superior teachers is driven by the provincial school
7, which has many young teachers ranked at the second class. If that school is removed
from the analysis the results correspond to our priors with the ordering of the eﬀect of
each type of teachers consistent with the deﬁnition.
We examined how good the measures of teacher qualities are at explaining the diﬀer-
ences in between schools other than the peers. We ﬁnd that having a higher percentage
of superior and ﬁrst class teachers accounts for 35 − 50% of the variation in the school
ﬁxed eﬀect. We explored the relationship with extrinsic measures of teacher quality such
as highest degree attained and teaching experience and ﬁnd that they could only explain
5 − 10% of the variation. This result is consistent with other studies examining school
quality which suggest that a good measure of teacher quality is essential to any such
studies.28 In fact replacing the teacher quality variables with these extrinsic measures
suggested that a 1% increase in the quality of peers will lead to an implausible 0.80% in-
crease in one’s score on the college entrance examination. This suggests that the extrinsic
measures may be negatively correlated with actual teaching quality.
28This point was originally made in Murnane (1975) and stressed in the inﬂuential survey
by Eric Hanushek (1986).
21The second column of Table 2 reports the results from exploiting the natural regression
discontinuities created by the entrance exam cutoﬀ rules for entry into diﬀerent ranked
secondary schools.29 This addresses the concern that our ability, past achievement and
demographic variables may not capture all the individual diﬀerences across students that
aﬀects future academic outcomes. We compare the outcomes for students who scored
similarly (within 20 points or 2.9%) and tightly around the cutoﬀ scores of the provincial
model schools on the high school entrance examination. Within a tight range of 20 points
on a 685-point exam, the academic abilities and achievements of the students are hardly
discernibly diﬀerent, but they were enrolled in diﬀerent schools with diﬀerent peers due
to keen competition described in section 2. The use of this sample is similar to a natural
experiment in that most of the diﬀerence between college entrance examination scores of
this group of students who attend diﬀerent schools must be attributed to diﬀerences in
the behavior and composition of the peer groups and diﬀerences in school inputs.
In this subsample students scored similarly and within a twenty point interval on
t h eh i g hs c h o o le n t r a n c ee x a m i n a t i o n . 30 Those who attended provincial schools in this
29Regression discontinuity estimators exploit discontinuities in the treatment assignment
mechanism that may develop because of rules governing access as in this study (or as in
Angrist and Lavy (1999) study of the eﬀects of class size on test scores) or geographic
boundaries (as in Black (1999) who estimated parents’ willingness to pay for higher quality
schools). The approach only identiﬁes treatment eﬀects locally at the point where the
probability of receiving treatment changes discontinuously. Even though the rule in our
case is deterministic we are not provided witht h et h r e s h o l ds c o r ef o re a c hp r o v i n c i a l
school. Thus, we can not use it as instrumental variable for the probability of receiving
the treatment (attending a provincial school).
30T h es c o r e si n c l u d e da r et h o s eb e t w e e n5 6 8t o5 8 8 .
22sample entered with an average score of 579.31 (standard deviation =7.92) which was less
than one point higher than students in the lower ranked schools (578.46 with standard
deviation= 7.92). Yet these students had access to higher quality peers (and diﬀerent
school resources31) and scored an average of 20 points (approximately 3% higher) greater
on the college entrance examination32. Mann Whitney tests conﬁrm that this diﬀerence
in performance on the college entrance examination is statistically signiﬁcant (z = -3.036,
Prob > |z| = 0.0024).
The OLS estimates for this subsample are carried out on 65% fewer students and
two fewer schools and as a result peer quality has signiﬁcantly less variation within and
between schools. The peer variance continues to be negatively and signiﬁcantly related
to higher scores on the college entrance examination, while the signs on the mean peer
variable and the quadratic term have changed from those obtained in the full sample.
The marginal peer eﬀect remains positive and is signiﬁcantly larger for this subsample
(0.518), with a convex relationship on peer eﬀects. Since the tuition variable is a perfect
predictor of attending provincial schools it is not included in the analysis.
31Mann Whitney tests for this sample demonstrate that there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences
in peer ability between provincial and non- provincial schools (z =-20.165, Prob > |z|
= 0.00). For the school resources presented in table 1 signiﬁcant diﬀerences between
provincial and non provincial school exist only for years of teaching experience ( z =
1.640, Prob > |z| = 0.10) and teachers who instructed the subject in which they were
awarded their degree ( z = -1.94, Prob > |z| =0 . 0 5 ) .
32Provincial school students scored 453.48 (s. d.=54.90) versus a score of 431.04 (s.d.=
51.75) for students who attended lower ranked schools in this subsample.
234.2 How Do Peer Eﬀects Operate?
T h ec o n c a v i t yi nt h ef u l ls a m p l ea n dt h ec o n v e x i t yi nt h es u b s a m p l es u g g e s t st h a th e t -
erogeneity in students’ response to their peers may exist. To get a complete picture of
the heterogeneous responses, we employ a partial linear model where the mean peer vari-
able is entered as a nonparametric function to be estimated instead of a simple quadratic
function. The nonparametric estimate would not only explain the diﬀerence between the
shapes in the full sample versus the subsample but would also lend evidence to policy
discussions on whether to “stream” or “mix” students of diﬀerent abilities. Streaming
is to place students of similar abilities into the same group while mixing is to randomly
assign students into groups based on their abilities.33
A partial linear model allows us to enter the mean peer eﬀect variable in a nonpara-
metric fashion. To estimate a partial linear model we modify equation 5 as follows
AijT = β0 + β1XiT + h(P−ijT)+β2vVP jT + β3QjT + β4Ii + β5AijT−1 +  iT (8)
where h is a nonparametric function of the mean peer variable to be estimated and
VP jT is the variance of the peer variable. As before, we include the peer variance as
well as the remaining educational inputs as linear regressors. If a concave relationship is
estimated this would suggest that to increase total academic achievement, mixing students
of diﬀerent abilities is preferred.34 Similarly a convex relationship provides support for
33See Hallam (2002) and the references cited in Glewwe (1997) for a recent survey of
the ability grouping literature in education and economics respectively.
34Glewwe (1997) introduced a non-linear least squares (NLLS) estimator to determine
24streaming students. Entering the peer variable in a nonparametric manner will improve
parameter estimates of the individual β
0s if the peer variable is stochastic or if peers aﬀect
achievement in a manner that can not be captured by only two terms. Since improved
parameter estimates are obtained this has a secondary beneﬁt of improving the estimation
of the shape of the peer eﬀect function: h(P−ijT).35
The nonparametric estimates of peer eﬀects are presented in Figure 1. The shape is
statistically diﬀerent from a horizontal line which further veriﬁes the existence of peer
eﬀects in China’s secondary schools. The graph of the conditional achievement on av-
erage peer quality starts as concave and alternates between convexity and concavity as
peer quality increases. Moreover, neither a concave or convex ﬁgure could lie within a
90% conﬁdence interval of the estimated curve. The results explain the diﬀerent shapes
whether streaming is preferred to mixing. This estimation takes account the distribution
of peer group characteristics and draws on a Box-Cox ﬂexible functional form of the mean
peer variable. An advantage of this approach is ease of interpretation of the results as
the sign of one parameter estimate is enough to determine whether streaming is preferred
to mixing. The downside to this approach is that the functional form assumed is still
restrictive. This approach assumes that policymakers have a utilitarian welfare function
and that individuals only gain utility from the level of achievement they obtain. NLLS
estimates with our data (available from the authors on request) suggest that mixing is pre-
ferred to streaming. Yet neither a concave or convex function could ﬁt the nonparametric
function estimated in Figure 1 even with an addition of a 90% conﬁdence interval.
35Methods to estimate this equation are introduced in Robinson (1988). We follow
the “double diﬀerencing” approach suggested in Robinson (1988) using a local linear
regression estimator in place of the traditional kernel regression estimator. As shown in
Fan (1992) the bias of the local linear regression estimator does not depend on the design
density of the data. Second, the local linear regression estimator avoids the boundary
bias problem associated with kernel regression estimators. We experimented with four
diﬀerent bandwidths and there were no major diﬀerences in the shape of the Figure.
25we obtained using the full sample and subsample near the discontinuity. Further, they
demonstrate the dilemma educational policy makers may face in determining whether
streaming or mixing students will obtain higher future average achievement. Students at
the low end of the conditional achievement beneﬁt substantially from mixing with better
peers whereas students at the high end gain from streaming, while students in the middle
may prefer to be mixed with certain peers but streamed from other peers. The decision
on streaming or mixing may depend not only on the particular group of students involved
but also on policy makers’ preferences in trading oﬀ achievements of diﬀerent groups of
students, which is beyond the scope of positive economic analysis.36
The above ﬁndings have focused on how peers aﬀe c ta v e r a g ep e r f o r m a n c e .T h ei m p a c t
of observed factors may vary over the distribution of unobserved factors (i.e. ability) that
aﬀect achievement.37 To examine this hypothesis we reestimate equation 5 via quantile
regression using quantiles ranging from 0.05 to 0.95 at each 0.05. Quantile regression
provides a more ﬂexible approach to characterizing the eﬀects of observed covariates
such as peer groups on diﬀerent percentiles of the conditional achievement distribution
36This requires that a social planner knows the exact form of the social welfare function
deﬁned for each possible achievement distribution for the population (i.e. it is strongly
separable with respect to each individual achievement value). Whether such a utilitarian
social welfare function is the right one for society is a question that is left to the reader
and beyond the current scope of this paper.
37In all speciﬁcations we assume separability between student characteristics, school
quality variables and peer group eﬀects. Quantile regression allows students with diﬀerent
unobserved factors to respond diﬀerently to observed factors. If the coeﬃcient estimates
diﬀer across quantiles heterogeneous eﬀects are present. Note that at each of the 19
quantiles each of the three peer quality variables were statistically signiﬁcant.
26providing a richer pattern on how peer groups aﬀect student achievement. Implicitly
we are allowing peer groups and ability to be two separate factors in the generation of
achievement (equation 4) to interact in unknown ways . If ability and peer groups are
substitutes we would expect the marginal returns on peers to decrease with ability. If
ability and peer groups are complements then marginal returns to peers would be higher
for the more able.
Figure 2 presents the results corresponding to our baseline speciﬁcation for regressors
such as the student’s own incoming test score and peer eﬀect variables. The solid line
in each graph represents the ordinary least squares estimate of the mean eﬀect. Each
triangle represents one of the 19 quantile regression coeﬃcient estimates. The eﬀect of
incoming test scores presents an inverted U graph where the largest gains are for those
students in the middle quantiles.
While the mean peer variable demonstrates that the strongest gains accrue to those in
the lowest quantile, the quadratic peer variable shows that these individuals also achieve
the smallest beneﬁts to achievement. Without common support of the peer variables
across diﬀerent quantiles, we cannot calculate comparable marginal eﬀe c t sa sac o m m o n
set of peer values are needed. If we assign the average of all peers as the common peer, a
graph of the marginal eﬀect across quantiles demonstrates the largest gains from having
higher quality peers appear in the middle quantiles. Students in the lowest quantiles
gain the least-only half of what the students gain in the higher quantiles. Finally, all
27individuals beneﬁt from less variation in their classmates’ performance, although those at
the higher quantiles are not as negatively aﬀected by increases in this variation.
It is clear that the heterogeneity of peer group eﬀects operates in at least two di-
mensions. First, the quantile regression results demonstrate that students of diﬀerent
unobserved abilities respond to the same peer diﬀerently. and we are able to reject the
hypothesis of homogeneity in the returns to peer groups. Second, estimates from the par-
tial liner model demonstrate that same student will respond in a heterogeneous manner
to diﬀerent compositions of their peer groups.
4.3 Are the results robust?
To address the concerns (despite the advantages of the data and the controls we employ)
that there may still exist some unobserved or omitted diﬀerences across schools that drive
the results in Tables 2, we consider ﬁxed eﬀect estimation. This can be accommodated in
our framework by relaxing the assumption that the school quality variables are measured
perfectly (Qt
jT) and allow for the possibility that they are measured with error (Qm
jT) as





jT + ujT (9)
If we were to allow the random noise term (ujT) to be correlated with some exogenous
regressors in equation 5 and employ a ﬁxed eﬀects estimator (which are regularly used
in empirical studies of peer eﬀects) we are unable to uniquely identify the mean peer
28eﬀect coeﬃcient.38 The coeﬃcients of nonlinear peer variables can still be identiﬁed. To
demonstrate this consider substituting equation 9 into equation 5,
AijT = β0 + β1XiT + β2P−ijT + β3(Q
t
jT + ujT)+β4Ii + β5AijT−1+ ∈iT
Rewriting this equation at the mean level for each school j,w eg e t
AijT = β0j + β1XiT + β2P−ijT + β3QjT + β4Ii + β5AijT−1 + ∈iT





P−ijT = AijT−1 if P−ijT is the mean peer eﬀect.
The ﬁxed eﬀect regression is carried out on the following equation
AijT−AijT = β1(XiT−XiT)+β2(P−ijT−P−ijT)+β4(Ii−Ii)





β5(AijT−1−AijT−1)+( iT − ∈iT) (10)
Notice that β2 cannot be identiﬁed separately from β5 due to perfect correlation between
the transformed mean peer variable and one’s past achievement as (Nj − 1) does not
38We have also considered the case where this random noise term (ujT) is normally
distributed with zero mean and uncorrelated with all the other exogenous regressors in
equation 5 and incorporate a random eﬀects estimator to achieve consistent estimates. The
patterns of estimates were similar in magnitude, sign and signiﬁcance to those obtained
with OLS for both the full and subsample. The results (available from the authors by
request) suggest that a 1% increase in the quality of peers will increase one’s score on the
college entrance examination by 0.154%, which is equivalent to more than one seventh
(0.151%)t h ee ﬀect of a corresponding increase in one’s own earlier achievement score for
the full sample and 0.354 for the subsample.
29vary for each individual. The mean peer eﬀect can not be identiﬁed in this setting.
Further, if one were to use current test scores to deﬁne the peer variables as considered
in several studies (recall this also introduces a reﬂection problem), the transformed peer
eﬀect variable would perfectly explain the transformed dependent variable.
The coeﬃcients on the nonlinear peer variables can still be “identiﬁed" in these ﬁxed
eﬀect regressions as such perfect co-movement does not apply to the quadratic or the vari-
ance terms.39 However only qualitative interpretation of these coeﬃcients is meaningful
as the marginal eﬀect cannot be calculated. Moreover the results are still sensitive to any
variation in school sizes and may suﬀer from lack of variation within schools.
A strategy that helps us to identify whether mean peer eﬀects exist when the random
noise term, ujT, is correlated with some exogenous regressors in equation 5 is as follows.
We randomly assign with replacement each student a classmate from the same school.
We then recalculate the peer eﬀect variable for each student omitting oneself as before
but also the randomly assigned classmate from that school. This serves to break the
perfect correlation between the mean peer and earlier achievement regressors to achieve
identiﬁcation, although multicollinearity arises instead which renders mean peer estimate
imprecise. Since this newly constructed peer variable can be viewed as if it were measured
with error, the estimates are biased towards zero in absolute value and statistical rejection.
39In theory when the full rank condition is violated, identiﬁcation is not possible. In
practice, canned software packages typically achieve identiﬁcation by dropping one of the
perfectly correlated variables or a single observation.
30Column 1 of Table 3 presents summary results from one hundred ﬁxed eﬀects regres-
sions with diﬀerent classmates randomly removed with replacement. The average of the
estimated peer eﬀect coeﬃcients, while large in scale due to the limited variation in the
peer variables within a school, are exactly the same in terms of signs and statistical sig-
niﬁcance as those in OLS and random eﬀects. This renders it unlikely that something
unobserved or omitted is driving the results, at least qualitatively. We ﬁnd that the vari-
ance of the peer quality is negatively related to student performance at the 1% level in
each of the 100 individual regressions. We also ﬁnd that in 72 of the 100 individual re-
gressions both the mean peer and the quadratic peer are statistically signiﬁcantly and in
a concave manner. Moreover, the three peer variables are always jointly signiﬁcant in all
the regressions. Since the design of our identiﬁcation strategy may bias these coeﬃcients
towards zero in absolute value and statistical rejection, the ﬁndings strongly reinforce
the existence of peer eﬀects in secondary schools. Further, they demonstrate conclusively
that the negative and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects of higher order moments of the peer
variable on student achievement are not driven by omitted school characteristics.
Column 2 of Table 3 presents ﬁxed eﬀects regression results for the subsample near the
entrance cutoﬀ discontinuity.40 Since we have only 406 students in seven schools consistent
40Fixed eﬀects regressions are identiﬁed with this subsample since the peer variable is
deﬁned over the full sample rather than the subsample in the regression which prevents
perfect correlation. However, multicollinearity may render the estimate on the mean peer
variable imprecise.
31estimates can not be obtained due to the incidental parameters problem.41 To remedy the
situation we run school type ﬁxed eﬀects (provincial vs. lower ranked schools). In the ﬁrst
column we omit teacher quality variables which vary across schools within school types.
The pattern across both columns is consistent with the OLS results. Peer eﬀects enter
signiﬁcantly in a convex manner and the peer variance remains negatively and signiﬁcantly
related to higher scores on the college entrance examination.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper, we employ a unique and rich dataset from a county in China’s Jiangsu
province to investigate whether peer group eﬀects exist. The secondary school system in
China diﬀers markedly from that of the United States and its features and institutional
structure yield signiﬁcant beneﬁts to identify the impacts of peer group characteristics on
s t u d e n ta c h i e v e m e n t .I np a r t i c u l a r ,i )w ea r ea b l et os e p a r a t et h ee ﬀect of teacher quality
from peer eﬀects ii) attrition bias is of little concern iii) we have valid outcome measures
that are accurate and comprehensive and iv) students are assigned into schools based
primarily on observables. Therefore, the majority of cross sectional variation in students’
peers is not generated by self-selection in our setting. Our methodology overcomes the
41Asymptotics require either the number of students within a school or the number of
s c h o o l st og ot oi n ﬁnity. There exists substantial Monte Carlo evidence that ﬁxed eﬀects
estimates perform poorly when neither dimension is greater than 50. In our subsample
the number of students within a school averages 58 with 3 schools having fewer than 40
students.
32reﬂection problem and deals with the possibility that the school quality variables may be
measured with error.
We ﬁnd strong and robust evidence that peer eﬀects exist. We ﬁnd that peer groups
contribute signiﬁcantly and positively to student performance measured by test scores.
Our evidence is strongest in showing that peer groups operate in a nonlinear manner and
all individuals respond negatively to an increase in the variation of peer quality. The
marginal eﬀect of a one percent increase in the quality of peers on student achievement is
equivalent to between 8−15% of a one percent increase in one’s own earlier achievement.
We ﬁnd that peer eﬀects operate in a heterogenous manner. High ability students
beneﬁt more from having higher achieving schoolmates and from having less variation in
peer quality than students of lower ability. Further, our semiparametric estimates clarify
the trade-oﬀs facing educational policy makers in constructing a policy that exploits the
existence of peer eﬀects to increase future average test scores.
Finally, we demonstrated that the magnitude of our results are sensitive to the school
quality variables included in the estimating equation. The plausible economic signiﬁcance
of the peer eﬀects relies on the use of teacher quality variables that are strongly correlated
with actual teaching performance.
While we argue that our data and methodology overcome the majority of statistical
problems associated with peer eﬀects estimation, we are aware of the limitations of this
study. First, there is substantially less variation in student ability in China than that
33in the US public high schools. Second, the county is only representative of the aﬄuent
coastal regions of China.
To summarize, this study provides the most compelling evidence to date on the exis-
tence of peer eﬀects at the secondary school level. The institutional structure of China’s
secondary education system mitigates traditional biases related to selection of schools and
attrition assisting in identifying the role of school inputs including peer groups. All stu-
dents appear to beneﬁt from having higher achieving schoolmates in a non-linear manner
and from having less variation in the quality of students within their schools. Hetero-
geneity arises from students of diﬀerent abilities responding to same peers diﬀerently and
same students responding to diﬀerent peer qualities diﬀerently.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics on Teachers, School Investment and Students 
School  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 












% of Superior  
teachers 
13.04% 10.27% 9.61%  11.36% 26.61%  9.38% 6.09% 10.00%  21.59% 
% of First class 
teachers 
24.22% 32.19% 35.90% 39.39% 22.94% 41.67% 30.43% 40.00% 35.23% 
% of Second 
class teachers  
28.57% 33.56% 28.21% 28.03% 25.69% 37.5%  50.43% 22.00% 27.27% 
% of Third class 
teachers  









































% of teachers 
with university  
22.36% 40.41% 25.64% 25.00% 75.23% 30.21% 66.96% 39.00% 63.64% 
% of teachers 
with college 
60.87% 53.42% 71.79% 50.00% 21.10% 68.75% 31.30% 56.00% 29.54% 
% of teachers 




















% of teachers 




















































N. A.  N. A. 
% of Female 
Teachers 
29.19% 30.82% 39.74% 28.03% 33.95% 38.54% 46.09% 23.00% 
 
27.27% 
Number of   
Teachers 
150 128 156 128 106 84  115 100 88 
1996 per Pupil 
Investment  
3838.23 5557.09 3620.32 4670.65 8180.22 2785.70 8539.57 3431.36 4522.07 
1997 per Pupil 
Investment 
4769.49 9029.15 6228.72 3419.32 11657.8 3425.76 16861.1 4705.12 6187.96 
1998 per Pupil  
Investment 
6340.30 10671.1 7212.99 8743.96 12309.4 4216.22 14055.3 5498.33 5126.18 
Average Score 




















% of students in 
higher education 
31.28% 50.66% 52.66% 44.40% 94.95% 39.33% 40.19% 35.50% 66.24% 







 Table 2: Ordinary Least Squares Estimates of the Achievement Equation
Variable Full Sample Subsample near Cutoﬀ Score



























































































Rs q u a r e d 0.682 0.677
Observations 1241 1241
Note: Corrected standard errors at the school level in parentheses for OLS estimates.














































































































L e v e lo fF i x e dE ﬀect School School Type School Type
R squared N.A. 0.233 0.254
Observations 1241 402 402
Note: The mean and standard deviation in parentheses of the coeﬃcient estimates from 100
individual regressions are presented in column 1. Column 2 and 3 present ﬁxed eﬀects













75 80 85 90 95
-254.166
-180.613




 OLS coefficient estimate  Quantile regression coefficient








 OLS coefficient estimate  Quantile regression coefficient








 OLS coefficient estimate  Quantile regression coefficient






Variance of Peer Effect
(mean) quantile
 OLS coefficient estimate  Quantile regression coefficient






Figure 2: Quantile Regression Results for CSEE Score Baseline Speciﬁcation
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